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Democracy and Constitutional Change
Allan C. Hutchinson and Joel Colon‐Rios*

“Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence and deem them
like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of
the preceding age a wisdom more than human and suppose what they did to be
beyond amendment.”
– Thomas Jefferson1
The relationship between democracy and constitutions is a long and fractitious one. Those who
lean towards the constitutionalist side have tended to perceive democracy as a threat to
political order and the preservation of important values, whereas those who take a more
democratist stance tend to treat constitutions as elite hindrances to popular rule as much as
anything else. However, today, the prevailing view is decidedly more constitutionalist than
democratist. Theorists, politicians and judges value the democratic worth of popular
participation, but maintain that it must be channelled and disciplined within a larger
constitutional structure: complicated amendment procedures, judicial review of legislation that
is deemed inconsistent with the constitution, and limited opportunities for direct popular
involvement in political decision‐making. Indeed, far from negating democracy,
constitutionalism is promoted as creating an orderly framework within which democracy can be
protected and thrive. So contained, democracy will allow citizens to involve themselves more
appropriately in political governance and make reasonable political decisions. As crisply stated
by the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada, “viewed correctly, constitutionalism and the
rule of law are not in conflict with democracy; rather, they are essential to it.”2
However, although infrequently canvassed and only occasionally championed, the case for a
more democratist approach to the challenges of political governance in modern states warrants
renewed and more sustained attention. The constitutionalist distrust of popular and active
participation in the elaboration and amendment of fundamental laws has been accepted
without sufficient challenge; the spectre of mobocracy has been invoked too readily. In this
paper, we will give the constitutionalist thesis a broader theoretical and political scrutiny. In
*

Distinguished Research Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Canada and Lecturer, Law School,
University of Wellington, New Zealand. We are grateful to *** for their critical comments and helpful suggestions.

1

Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12th, 1816 in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 558‐59
(1975). Of course, he was no ‘Saint Thomas’ – he wanted to extend the franchise exclusively to white men. See J.
APPLEBY, JEFFERSON (2003).

2

Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R 217 at para. 78).
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doing so, the critical ambition will be to tally the shortcomings of such a stance and to
reinvigorate a more democratist approach. By way of explanation, we will address and
recommend the possibilities and problems for putting into practical operation such an anti‐
constitutionalist stance; the recent experience of the U.S. State of California offers itself as a
good forcing‐ground for these ideas.
In short, from a democratic standpoint, the challenge for the citizenry is not so much about
defining the values of constitutions, but constitutions whose change is outside the scope of
popular decision making, supposed to exclusively take place through judicial interpretation or
through an amendment formula designed precisely to make change difficult and unlikely. Too
often, constitutions place checks and limits on democratic participation in the name of some
other set of vaunted truths or elite‐favouring values. For the strong democrat, it is formal
constitutions and their institutional paraphernalia that do more to inhibit and dull democracy’s
emancipatory potential than to nurture and fulfil it.

I. THE BODY CONSTITUTIONAL
A useful point of departure for our analysis is the work of Elkins, Ginsberg, and Melton.3 In their
recent book, these authors take the traditional constitutionalist stance to its logical conclusion:
a concern with the endurance of national constitutions. At the heart of their empirical project is
the question “why ... do some constitutions endure, whereas others fail?”4 They thus engage
in the considerable task of sifting through a data‐set that covers every independent state from
1789 to 2005 and that represents 935 constitutions in 200 different nation states. With clarity
and subtlety, these authors report that, although the US constitution has endured for 220
years, most constitutions only last a couple of decades: the median life expectancy of national
constitutions is 19 years which, as the authors point out, is exactly what a young Jefferson
thought was their ‘optimal’ life‐span).5 Destabilising factors include economic crises, armed
conflict, regime change, territorial realignment, and the like. Moreover, these hazards to a
constitution’s continued existence are not evenly spread; they are vulnerable early and their
demise peaks around 17 years, but decreases until it is lowest around 50 years 6 For
democracies, the average life‐span is about 21 years.7
While Elkins, Ginsberg, and Melton concede that “there are some real benefits of periodic
constitutional replacement”8 they very much work from the definite assumption that ‘a long life
is a better life’ and that ‘survival is success’. For them, a long life‐expectancy is the best
3

Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsberg, and James Melton, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS (2009)

4

Ibid. at 2.

5

Jefferson, supra note 1, at 560.

6

Ibid. at 131.

7

Ibid. at 137.

8

Elkins, et. al, supra note 3, at 207.
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indicator of constitutional health; the longer constitutions live, the better a nation’s
constitutional health can be considered to be. Of course, there will be exceptions to this, but
these only manage to prove the statistical rule. So wedded to this assumption are these
authors that they conclude their impressive study with the telling summation that “the life
expectancy of constitutions, if anything, has decreased over the last 200 years,... [such that]
unlike human beings, the health of constitutions is not getting better with modernity.”9
Although this is a disturbing wake‐up call for most of the world’s constitutional practitioners
and theorists, it might be heard by their constitutionalist kin as soothing music to their ears.
Elkins, Ginsberg and Melton’s insistence on treating constitutions as if they were people reveals
several problems with the traditional constitutionalist concern with constitutional endurance.
The first problem is that, even if their physiological analogy is a valid one, it assumes that living
a long life is the sole or best measure of a good life. While a longer life is a preferable goal, it is
not the only one nor is it the pre‐dominant one. For many, the length of life has to be set‐off
against the quality of that life; a wretched, but long life is not always preferable to a shorter
one that is fuller and more rewarding. Indeed, this single‐minded focus on extending life‐span
becomes particularly contentious as people get older. Many have no great desire to be kept
alive by all means necessary and make the positive choice not to be resuscitated or be
dependent on life‐support when their general health and quality of life drops below a certain
level. ‘Endurance’ in itself holds little appeal and often brings with it great concern for the
elderly and sick. “Rage, rage against the dying of the light” is not the mantra of everyone;
darkness and death can occasionally have their own satisfaction.10
The same goes for divorce. While a low rate of divorce might be considered to be more
desirable, this is hardly a self‐evident or uncontroversial judgement. Like the equation of long
life with good health, the choice in favour of ‘enduring marriages’ demands a degree of balance
between quantitative and qualitative considerations. Whether it is better for a couple to stay
together come‐what‐may or to go their separate ways depends upon the standard by which
successful or happy lives are to be measured. For instance, it is not apparent that partners and
children will lead a more fulfilled life within a warring family as opposed to a separated one.
Any resolution of these matters is squarely normative, not merely empirical.
The second problem is it is unclear why it is desirable or useful to treat constitutions as if they
were living persons. An analogy is only helpful and illuminating if it has some normative point.
While it is possible to compare constitutions to a whole cast of living things (e.g., fruit flies,
trees, dinosaurs, etc.), such analogies do little work unless they show constitutions in a
9

Ibid. at 214.

10

DYLAN THOMAS, SELECTED POEMS 131‐33 (W. Davies ed. 1974). Although still a controversial notion, there is
an international movement that facilitates dignity in dying. See DANIEL HILLYARD AND JOHN DOMBRINK, DYING
RIGHT : THE DEATH WITH DIGNITY MOVEMENT (2001).
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revealing or novel way. But, without some defence or explanation, the comparison can be as
misleading as it is informative. The fact that the US constitution has endured for 220 years is
insufficient in itself to warrant praise (or even criticism); the course and content of American
history need to be assessed against some independent and evaluative criteria of political
success. The implicit standard behind this view is that of institutional order and political
stability; the celebration of ‘endurance’ places these formal virtues ahead of all others. States
with old constitutions are in general better than those which change constitutions more
frequently.
Elkins, Ginsberg and Melton appear to be indifferent to the need for or appeal of democracy as
a guiding political value; democracy is considered to be one of the secondary attributes that
might be thought of as instrumental to the continuing life and endurance of constitutions. They
report that democratic stability (as opposed to non‐democratic governance) is found to be
closely tied to constitutional stability and that “enduring constitutions are good for young
democracies”11. Moreover, they go on to defend an explicitly constitutionalist approach to
national governance. They maintain that:
[C]onstitutions generate a set of inviolable principles and more specific
provisions to which future law and government activity more generally must
conform. This function ... is vital to the functioning of democracy. Without a
commitment to higher law, the state operates for the short‐term benefit of
those in power or the current majority.... By limiting the scope of government
and recommitting politicians to respect certain limits, constitutions make
government possible .12
In this passage, the authors touch base with all the informing features of contemporary
constitutionalism and its ingrained distrust of democracy – inviolable principles beyond
democratic reach; limits on democratic participation; constitutions as guarantors of democracy;
and the authority of ‘higher law’. The basic idea is that, because constitutions are meant to
capture not simply a fleeting consensus, but some more universal truths, then no periodic
revision of fundamental laws through popular participation is needed or desirable.13 Indeed,
the extent to which democracy is seen as merely facilitative of and inferior to more significant
values and enduring processes is glimpsed by their argument that “democracy is measurably
more hospitable to constitutions ... than the authoritarian situation”14 as if this was some
recommendation or support for the priority of constitutionalism over democracy. If some
regime approximating to an ‘authoritarian situation’ was more found to be more hospitable,
then presumably one should be indifferent to the presence or promise of the democratic ideal.

11

Elkins et. al., supra note 3, at 35.

12

Ibid. at 38.

13

For an extended critique of this non‐democratic philosophy of law and constitutions, see A. HUTCHINSON, THE
PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DEMOCRATISED (2009).
14

Elkins et. al., supra note 3, at 137.
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Of course, this sceptical and frankly begrudging attitude towards democracy is nothing new.
Even as there has been frequent and fulsome support for democratic values and processes,
there has been a distinct distrust of ordinary citizens’ capacity to participate fully, freely,
frequently and actively in their own governance. In the twentieth century, democracy came to
be associated almost exclusively with the institutional and competitive struggle for people’s
votes by those leaders who sought political power.15 Indeed, a sceptical review of democracy’s
history suggests that there is almost a disturbing inverse correlation between the extension of
the franchise to more groups and a reduction in the amount and areas of power in which the
enfranchised can participate: the more that people are allowed to participate as an electorate,
the less that is assigned to their decision‐making authority. Accommodating prescriptive ideals
to descriptive realities, commentators and politicians reduced popular participation to little
more than the demand for free and fair elections among multiple political parties in a context
of relatively open information: “democracy is government by officials who are accountable and
removable by the majority of people in a jurisdiction”.16 Along with the judicially‐enforced
protection of basic civil rights, this constrained idea of democracy has come to dominate
constitutional law and theory; the goal of a more extensive popular participation seems to have
fallen by the wayside.17
The main thrust of writings by contemporary constitutional theorists take a similar tack. While
they are not hostile to democracy, they do not take its demands or dynamics very seriously;
theirs is a cautious and inhibited approach. They concede that democracy is necessary and
praiseworthy, but they view it as being far from the animating or central feature of modern
constitutional arrangements. There are three basic constitutionalist approaches on offer:
1.

15

A rights‐based approach that recommends the permanence of a constitutional regime
that is reputed to rest on the ‘right’ abstract moral principles and political precepts.18
With interpretive power residing in unelected and unaccountable judicial pro‐consuls,

See J.A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1947).

16

JOSEPH NYE, THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD’S ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN’T GO IT ALONE
109 (2002). This exemplifies the dominant tradition in political theory. See SCHUMPETER, ibid.; ROBERT A. DAHL,
A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY: HOW DOES POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY FUNCTION IN AMERICA? (1956);
ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); and HARRY ECKSTEIN, A THEORY OF STABLE
DEMOCRACY (1961).
17

There is a sub‐field of scholarly endeavour which attempts to measure democracy by establishing objective
indicators that measure Dahl’s contestative and participatory dimensions of democracy. See, for example,
DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND WELL‐BEING IN THE WORLD, 1950‐1990 (A.
Przeworski et al. eds 2000) and David Beetham, Towards a Universal Framework for Democracy Assessment, 11(2)
DEMOCRATIZATION 1 (2004).
18

See, for example, RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1996) and IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?: PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL DEBATE (2006).
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citizens and their representatives have little role in such a political regime other than to
conform to the almost transcendent authority of this entrenched scheme of social
justice;
2.

A more representative‐reinforcing approach allows to ‘the people’ the right to have the
constitution they want, but does little more than identify the people with the
legislature.19 Neglecting any actual participation by citizens in constitutional change,
any tension between constitutionalism and democracy is attributed to the contested
limits imposed by judicial review on the powers of the democratically‐elected
legislature; and

3.

A more populist approach that aims at closing the gap between citizens and their
representatives, but it does so at the considerable cost of replacing the messy lives of
flesh‐and‐blood human beings who actually live under the constitutional regime with an
almost mythical and disembodied ‘People’ (always with a capital P) whose collective
wishes and interests are to be identified ex post facto and whose decisions are to be
protected by judges from the actions of the ordinary representatives.20

While each of these approaches offers valuable insights into the dilemmas and demands of
modern constitutional polities, they all succeed in reducing or limiting the role of democratic
participation – the rights‐based approach rejects entirely the idea that all laws, including
fundamental ones, must be permanently open to regular transformations through highly
democratic procedures; the representation‐reinforcing approach takes democracy much more
seriously, but fails to appreciate that there is more to democracy and popular participation than
majoritarian decision‐making through representative institutions and a distrust of judicial
review; and the popularist approach for all its good democratic intentions still manages to resist
the idea that genuinely democratic constitutional change mandates the actual participation of
citizens in constitutional politics, not merely the implied support of the People as divined by an
academy of self‐appointed experts. By so containing and confining direct democratic
participation, the constitution is given priority over democracy. The rough‐and‐tumble of
democratic politics is too risky and untamed for the precious world of these constitutionalists.

19

See, for example, JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999) and The Core of the Case Against
Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980); and RICHARD D. PARKER, HERE THE PEOPLE RULE: A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST MANIFESTO
(1994).
20

See, for example, BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of
the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994); and SANFORD
LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE
PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
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II. TOWARD A WEAK CONSTITUTIONALISM
Democracy is about self‐government. Its basic idea is that citizens come together as political
equals and decide for themselves the laws which will regulate their conduct and the institutions
under which they live. As such, democrats are especially preoccupied with sources.21 No
matter how substantively just a legal principle or rule seems to be, a democrat will always be
interested in questions about its origin and, therefore, its legitimacy. In particular, the whos
and hows of any established principle or enacted rule will be of compelling interest. A vital
dimension in the assessment of any legal norm as just is the fact that it originated in an exercise
of self‐legislation by the governed, not simply imposed or made on their behalf: democracy is
about rule by the people and not only for the people.22 However, the democratic pedigree of a
law is not the only concern of a democrat: democratic lineage is a necessary, if not always
sufficient condition for an initiative’s just quality. Both the matter and manner of laws are
important. Indeed, it is the procedural mode of their creation that bolsters and underwrites
the substantive merit of those laws; matter and manner are intimately related and re‐
enforcing. While this attention to sources has considerable salience in the legislative arena, its
implications are even more pressing in regard to constitutional or fundamental laws which, by
their nature, are often beyond the reach of day‐to‐day politics.
The amenability of constitutional arrangements and fundamental laws to periodic re‐
consideration and revision seems an indispensable part of any democratic compact. Even if it
requires some trade‐offs and compromises to be put into practice in large societies, strong
democracy is a regime of popular self‐government which not only allows for, but relies upon
the regular participation by citizens in the formulation and enactment of the laws that govern
their lives. At its most general, it is the rule of everyone by everyone.23 For the democrat, a
political system that has entrenched the ‘right’ abstract principles in what is thought to be a
finished constitution and that has attempted to froze in place a particular juridical arrangement
sits uncomfortably with any genuine commitment to democracy. Democracy resists political
closure; it fosters, not forecloses political and popular engagement: a self‐governing people
must be able to confront and re‐formulate its commitments on a democratic and regular
In that respect, democracy supposes not only ample opportunities popular
basis.24
participation, but a regime consistent with the ideal of democratic openness: there can be no
set of laws whose authority is taken for granted and which are not subject to revision.
21

See Jeremy Waldron, Can There Be a Democratic Jurisprudence?, 58 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 675 (2009).

22

See, for example, Frank Michelman, Constitutional Authorship in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS 76 (Larry Alexander ed. 1998) and FRANK MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY (1999).
23

MICHAEL HARDT AND ANTONIO NEGRI, MULTITUDE: WAR AND DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF EMPIRE 240
(2004).

24

Cf. STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1995).
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While a more democratic position is not indifferent to outcomes and is promoted on the basis
that it will result in a more just society, its critical wager is that the governed will produce more
outcomes which are more conducive to society as a whole than those dictated by abstract and
partial principles or by elite institutions and agencies. As such, it should be clear that the
democratic critique is not about a conflict between rights and popular participation, but about
the institutionalization of a juridical arrangement that, by embodying certain principles and
values, is removed from democratic politics. If democracy is only about right outcomes, and if
those outcomes are already embedded in a constitutional arrangement and removed from
popular discussion and debate, the ideals of openness and popular participation with respect to
the fundamental laws are rendered meaningless. In sharp distinction, a democratist dynamic
insists that all arrangements must be open and fluid at least on regular and mandated
occasions and that this openness and fluidity is achieved through highly democratic procedures.
While the concern in non‐democratic societies to “organize political institutions so that bad or
incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too much damage” is understandable,25 it is
condescending and inappropriate in ostensibly democratic cultures. By and large, democrats
have been thwarted in their efforts to institutionalize the belief that the governed are not only
competent to elect their governors, but also entitled to make political judgments for
themselves about all, not only some substantive issues. If ordinary laws and especially
fundamental laws do not result from the exercise of popular participation, then there may be
talk of good or bad laws, but not of democracy. In a robust democracy, everything is always
‘up for grabs’ and present institutional arrangements should always be open to revision and
replacement, albeit not sporadically or haphazardly. It is not a case that ‘anything goes’, but
that anything might go.26 With democracy comes risk. But that is both the exhilarating promise
and the ever‐present danger of democratic governance.
Of course, there is a role for a constitution in such a truly democratic society. But, in contrast
to the dominant constitutionalist view, any constitution must be subject to the constituent
authority, approval and reappraisal of ordinary people. Any restraints on democracy can only
be justified in the name of democracy, not by some other set of supposedly superior values or
processes. There is a case to be made for a conceptual and practical re‐calibration that puts a
weak form of constitutionalism in the service of a strong democracy. Within such a model of
constitutionalism, fundamental laws would remain permanently open to democratic
transformations and popular interventions. There is no such thing as a ‘good’ or ‘finished’
constitution. Nor is weak constitutionalism compatible with the notion that such constitutions
might evolve, as most constitutionalists recommend, mainly through constitutional
interpretation,.27 Only such a conception of constitutionalism, when accompanied by a strong
25

KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (1965) vol. 1 at 107.

26

See Cornelius Castoriadis, The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy in CASTORIADIS READER 282 (David
Curtis ed. 1997). See also A. HUTCHINSON, IT’S ALL IN THE GAME: A NON‐FOUNDATIONALIST ACCOUNT OF LAW
AND ADJUDICATION (2000) and
27

See Elkins et. al., supra note 3, at 102‐108. See also WILL WALUCHOW, A COMMON LAW THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW: THE LIVING TREE (2007).
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democracy, is consistent with a serious commitment to the democratic ideal. However, this
supposes that democracy is not exhausted in legislatures and daily governance: it extends to
deliberating and deciding on the very content of the constitution itself. In contrast to the
‘representation‐reinforcing’ and populist’ approaches, we defend a distinction between
democracy at the level of daily governance and democracy at the level of the fundamental
laws. By their very nature, each of these dimensions demand and allow different levels of
popular engagement.
Any conception of constitutionalism that is more sensitive to the ideals of popular participation
and democratic openness insists that a constitution must not be the exclusive domain of elite
jurists and professional experts. Because it takes seriously the idea of democracy at the level of
the fundamental laws, it does not perceive an active citizenry as a threat to a society’s well‐
being, even when its actions might result in the destruction of the established constitution and
the emergence of a new one; popular participation is a cherished force for addressing and
remediating existing injustices. As such, the idea of constitutions as “bargains among elites”28 is
no more than half‐right. Because constitutions are ‘bargains’, they must be open to regular re‐
negotiation as circumstances and generations change. However, this most definitely cannot be
achieved by ‘elites’. In a democratic society, a constitution is the prize of all and, therefore,
must be the property of all; the opportunity to re‐negotiate the terms and conditions of the
society’s basic constitutional compact is a sine qua non of a strongly democratic polity.
So understood, weak constitutionalism comes accompanied by the idea that important
constitutional transformations should not be the work of ordinary institutions. Such
institutions are designed to operate at the level of daily governance when intense episodes of
popular participation are not always practically possible. Weak constitutionalism is not about a
constitution that, exactly like ordinary law, can be easily changed by democratic majorities if
the term ‘democratic majorities’ simply refers to a majority of state officials sitting in a
legislature. In fact, it requires a degree of openness that is neither possible nor desirable in the
context of an ordinary legislature. If a legislature, even if hampered by special procedural
safeguards, is granted the ample power to amend or revise the constitution without the active
involvement of citizens, democratic legitimacy is adversely affected. Even in the context of a
legislature unhindered by the rulings of competing curial forums, it should be ordinary citizens
who are accorded the direct power and authority to determine the content of the fundamental
laws.
Further, weak constitutionalism rests on an uncompromising commitment to a participating
and active citizenry. The citizen is not seen merely as a human being with rights that
participates occasionally in politics through the election of officials, but as someone who plays a
part in the (re‐) formulation of the norms that govern the state. In other words, a citizen
28

Elkins et al, supra note 3, at 7.
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contributes directly to the democratic legitimation of the constitutional regime and knows that,
despite all the imperfections of such an order, it can be changed. So understood, citizens might
identify more with the constitutional regime and think of it as their own, not simply as the
embodiment of the collective will of a mysterious People.29 When important constitutional
transformations are needed, this active citizenry engages in different forms of political
participation in order to create the political climate necessary for extraordinary mechanisms to
be activated.

III. OF CONSTITUENTS AND CHANGE
The constitutionalist antipathy towards popular participation is evidenced by the prevailing
approaches to constitutional reform. The motivating idea is that change should be infrequent
because the stability of a juridical order is a primary value to be protected. However, most
constitutionalists do concede that a large part of a liberal constitution’s legitimacy rests in the
fact that it can be changed through judicial means. Consequently, by way of compromise,
liberal constitutions tend to make the process of amendment so arduous that few proposals for
change are able to meet its stringent requirements.30 Moreover, the proto‐typical liberal
constitution rarely includes mechanisms which increase popular participation during times of
important constitutional transformation or crisis. There is little reference to, for example, the
election of delegates that deliberate in extra‐ordinary assemblies whose proposals have to be
ratified in referendums: democratic legitimacy is thought satisfied by the involvement and
authority of ordinary representatives.31 This effort to regulate transformative shifts not only
makes constitutional change difficult and infrequent, but also works to effect a permanent
closure of the political. By making all political power subservient to the disciplinary protocols of
the constitution and the Rule of Law, it no longer becomes reasonable to speak of important
constitutional transformations except after cataclysmic events, such as revolutions and coup
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d’états.32 Even after those events it is thought that “by making a constitution, the revolutionary
forces are digging their own graves.”33
Taking their cue from a Madisonian sensibility, constitutionalists recognise the subversive
potential of popular participation – that is why they oppose it. For them, popular participation
seems by its very nature problematic as it entails sharing decision‐making and granting political
power to ordinary citizens and non‐elitist initiatives.34 The ‘tyranny of the majority’ is perceived
to be much more a matter for concern than executive, judicial or minority tyranny. In order to
defuse the endurance‐threatening capabilities of a more participatory democracy, they offer a
place to representative democracy in the constitutional scheme of things so long as it is
constrained in such a way as to shore up rather than undermine the constitution’s stabilising
role. Constitutionalists tend to favour representative government (itself subject to different
kinds of limits, one of the most salient being judicial review) precisely because it would work as
a bulwark against a more rough‐and‐tumble popular participation. In short, they half‐heartedly
embrace popular participation, but only so as to smother it better.
Yet the fact that the contemporary institutions and arrangements considered ‘democratic’ bear
little resemblance to more participatory forms of political organization is not considered a
weakness or failing by constitutionalists. Indeed, the present constitutional set‐up in American‐
style governments is promoted as exhibiting the very kind of institutions and arrangements that
democrats should defend: the perverse position appears to have been reached in which
popular participation is almost dispensable and no longer treated as an essential part of what is
considered to be ‘democratic’. Under liberal constitutionalism, democracy is exhausted by a
constitution that establishes representative government, protects liberal rights, and enables all
citizens to ‘participate’ in government by the episodic election of legislative representatives or
through the judgments of their judicial officials. This is an impoverished and disabling idea of
democracy and one which has little place for the emancipatory potential of popular
participation and democratic openness. But it is also the diluted and defanged democracy of
constitutional democracy and its constitutionalist advocates.
In contrast, weak constitutionalism/strong democracy does not see constituent power – the
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underlying and enabling popular agency to create and re‐create constitutional regimes35 – as
something to be muzzled and contained. It embraces the idea that there is a permanent and
juridically unsolvable tension between the constitution and the political power which it
regulates and to which it owes its existence. Consequently, instead of privileging the enduring
supremacy of a constitution that is difficult or well‐nigh impossible to change, it recognizes the
constitution both as higher law and as open to the constituent power’s future re‐assertion of
itself. By taking such a stance, weak constitutionalism does not seek to resolve this tension. On
the contrary, it recognizes it as an inevitable consequence of having a constitution and actually
heightens it by giving to citizens the institutional means for acting together and claiming
political priority over the constitutional text, even if only episodically. Put differently, weak
constitutionalism allows for a viable and vibrant distinction between democratic governance
and democracy at the level of the fundamental laws.
When an important constitutional transformation is needed, strong democracy recommends
that changes to the constitution be made through an exercise of popular participation similar to
that present when the constitution was adopted in the first place. A constituent assembly,
composed of delegates commissioned to deliberate about the future of the constitutional
regime, is the preferred method through which democratic constitution‐making has
traditionally taken place. Ideally, such an assembly is convened in a context of strong popular
support for constitutional change, with the specific task of altering the constitutional regime,
elected in a way that maximizes the participation of all sectors of society, and it is not subject
by any limits found in positive law. Although the proposals of a constituent assembly are
normally ratified by the electorate before they come into effect, popular participation should
not be limited to a process in which experts draft the constitutional text and then submit it to a
‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote in a referendum; it must involve a process in which citizens are allowed to
propose, debate, and finally decide on the content of their constitution.
The constituent assembly avoids the most salient shortcomings present in the three main
approaches to constitutional theory. As a mechanism for the exercise of constituent power, it
allows the citizenry to approach the constitutional regime as radically open and susceptible to
any kind of modification. As an extraordinary body, it is based on a distinction between the
ordinary legislature and the people, between constituted and constituent powers. Finally, its
episodical nature facilitates intense popular participation in constitutional change. When
triggered by the citizens themselves (e.g., through the collection of signatures), a constituent
assembly would facilitate the realization of democracy at the level of the fundamental laws. In
fact, it would come very close to embody the ideals of democratic openness and popular
participation. On the one hand, a constituent assembly, as depository of the constituent power
35
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has no competencies and can make any change in the constitutional regime, no matter how
fundamental. It can even result in the (unlikely) abolishment or modification of the rights that
make any democratic exercise possible and in the alteration of the very amendment formula
that provides for its convocation, although if it does, it would destroy its very democratic
legitimacy together with that of the constitutional regime. On the other hand, unlike
constituent conventions convened exclusively by the legislature, it recognizes the citizenry as
the protagonist of important constitutional transformations from beginning to end.
There is always risk and there is absolutely no guarantee that ordinary citizens, as well as the
delegates to a constituent assembly, will be any more or less prone to get things ‘wrong’ than
judges, jurists, or elected representatives. However, the citizenry will not affect to opine in the
dubious accent of ‘universal truth’. Instead, they will only claim to speak for themselves and
not later generations who retain similar entitlement to re‐work the constitution. Indeed, Elkins,
Ginsberg, and Melton’s calculation that the average life‐span for constitutions in democracies is
about 50 years is perhaps a cause for regret, but not in the way that they think.36 If anything,
from a democratist standpoint, it is a little too long rather than too short as they imply.

IV. A CALIFORNIAN EXCEPTION?
If the endurance of constitutions is seen as an important political value, it should not come as a
surprise that for most constitutionalists, the US constitution is a thing of wonder. Still
manoeuvring strong at 221 years old and with no realistic end in sight, it is held up as the proud
exemplar of not only constitutional endurance, but also constitutional merit. As frequently
argued, its balanced provisions of specificity, flexibility, and inclusion, its occasional
amendment, and its reliance on judicial review to retain its modern relevance have probably
contributed to its longevity.37 However, why this extended life‐span should equate with its
excellence is entirely unclear. For many, the fact that it is almost unchangeable by formal
amendment is indictment enough.38 The stability of the constitutional order cannot in itself be
reason enough to support its prized quality. Indeed, from a democratist viewpoint, the resort
36
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to informal and elite modes of constitutional re‐invigoration, especially through sub‐
constitutional political change (e.g,. executive practice, legislative convention, etc.) and judicial
review, has exacerbated an already precarious situation for the vitality of democratic
governance.
The present economic and budgetary crisis being experienced by the United States government
offers a clear glimpse of the democratic limitations of a constitutionalist approach. In
formulating and implementing an effective strategy, the participatory role of the citizenry is
extremely distant and removed. Although each claims to represent ‘Main Street’ and not only
‘Wall Street’ and to speak on behalf of ‘ordinary Americans’, the involvement of those ordinary
residents of main‐street America are conspicuously lacking. Even if there is government for the
people (which, of course, is open to debate), it is not by the people. Moreover, not only are the
legislative and executive branches of government engaged in an elite and convoluted
confrontation of self‐interested politics, but Congress is itself viewed by many as entirely
dysfunctional in its capacity and willingness to respond in non‐partisan ways to national or any
other crises. Again, these debilitating traits of centralized and bureaucratic government are on
full display over efforts to reform the health care system. On all fronts, the formal and informal
structures of constitutional ordering are missing‐in‐action, power‐brokering is the name of the
game, and democracy has been reduced to little more than a rhetorical flourish.
The response of constitutionalists might well be that institutional opportunities for a more
participatory and engaged exercise of democratic involvement would do little to help and might
actually worsen the ability of government to act appropriately. Indeed, they might well point to
the trials and tribulations of the U.S. State of California. Already possessed of the most long‐
winded constitutions in the world, the state is not only fighting its own fiscal crisis, but there
have been constitutional proposals for a constitutional convention at which a new formal
document would be debated and drafted.39 Some allege that it is its very open and
democratically‐attuned constitutional structure which has worsened, if not precipitated this
parlous state of affairs. Along with a participatory procedure for budgetary and tax reform, the
villain of the piece is considered to be direct democracy. In the past 100 years, there have been
over 500 constitutional amendments by way of voter initiatives and referendums.
Constitutionalist critics contend that, while democratic participation is a good thing, too much
of it exercised too often can be a bad thing: democracy has its place, but that place must be
suitably constrained and balanced by other important values and processes.40 For
constitutionalists, California has the balance all wrong.
Judged by the standards of fiscal propriety and bureaucratic efficiency, neither a
39
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constitutionalist US governance model nor a democratist Californian governance framework
seems to be faring very well. Yet, if these were the only criteria of successful government, it
would matter little if there was a monarchical, authoritarian, popularist or any other kind of
constitutional arrangements in play; all that would count is the government’s ability to respond
in the right way to budgetary concerns. However, this suggests that there is some ‘right way’ to
achieve fiscal propriety when there are only different and divergent approaches – balanced
budget, social justice, democratic accountability, etc. – to the challenges of public finance
policy. The best route to take is not a technical calculation alone, but one that touches on
some of the most fundamental issues on the ideological agenda; there is no neutral or non‐
partisan position from which to act or evaluate.41 That being the case, there is no reason why
those decisions should be removed from the political arena of popular participation and left in
the hands of the political elite and their armies of technicians and mandarins. As with so many
other areas of government responsibility, there is no “higher law” or “set of inviolable
principles ... to which future law and government activity must conform ... [and which] make
government possible”.42 And, even if there were, it is unclear why they should not also be open
to regular and democratic transformation. Under the existing constitutionalist mind‐set,
popular participation is limited to the infrequent and inadequate occasions of term‐elections
(which garner less and less popular support as evidenced by the high rate of abstentions).
Of course, there is no mandate, democratic or otherwise, to recommend that all decisions of
government must be amenable to popular and direct participation by citizens. However, and as
importantly, there is no reason that the occasions for such involvement should not be increased
and made more effective. By ensuring a regular process of democratic engagement, the
citizenry might not only develop a better taste and understanding for resolving political
challenges, but also begin to take responsibility for the community’s problems as well as their
solutions; they will have a stake in the polity’s political life as well as in its laws. In a strong
democracy, a constitution would facilitate and expand such involvement by developing and
ensuring that the most fundamental and important matters of governmental policy, including
the institutions and processes of democratic participation themselves, would be regularly put
to the citizenry for possible re‐formulation and resolution. In contrast to constitutionalists,
democrats would put their faith in the people’s actual views than in the views of a professional
elite, even if clothed in the dubious trappings of representative legitimacy, about what is best
for people. Democracy is to be the rule in constitutional governance, not the exception.
Consequently, in contrast to the likely constitutionalist apprehension about the present
41
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happenings in California, we maintain that the democratic forces at work there offer a better
or, at least, as much a chance as any other set of constitutional arrangement in confronting the
contemporary dilemmas of political governance. Of course, there is no guarantee at all that
Californians (as any other people) will get it right (i.e., make decisions that receive the approval
of the political elite); the recent and continuing struggle over ‘gay marriage’ is ample evidence
of this.43 Nevertheless, the Californian citizenry are not claiming to speak in the name of
‘inviolable principles’ or ‘enduring precepts’. They are simply expressing their views at a certain
moment in social history which, by the very nature of that fact, can be changed in the normal
order of constitutional and political contestation. For this reason, the recent Californian
proposal for the first constitutional convention in over a century, whose members would have
been ordinary citizens selected randomly by a jury‐like process, should have been greeted with
democratic enthusiasm. It ought to be a far from dismaying prospect that there will be nothing
resembling a Madisonian “assembly of demi‐gods” as happened in Philadelphia in 1787 when
America’s still‐surviving constitution was plotted and drafted.44 Leaving such important
decisions to ordinary people should be seen not as the symptom of an ailing system in need of
constitutionalist intervention, but as an encouraging sign of rude democratic health.
The more widespread adoption of popular institutions, like California’s ‘constituent assembly’,
would signify a profound break from the 18thcentury tradition which still holds sway over
constitutional theorists and which Jefferson so forcefully criticized – looking at “constitutions
with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be
touched.”45 By energizing citizens as democratic constitution‐makers, it would signal that
genuine constitutional change might not only be possible, but might also work to correct
existing and present injustices. Accordingly, from a democratist standpoint, the merit of a
constitution is to be found not so much in its longevity and its force towards stability, but in its
capacity for both democratic participation and constitutional transformation. It is not only
whether people can take part in constitutional decision‐making, but how easily, how often, and
how actively they can do so; there must be adequate mechanisms and processes in place to
maximize these opportunities. When it comes to constitutions in democracies, it might be said
that ‘only the good die young’.
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V. CONCLUSION
The favoured resolution of the constitutionalism‐democracy debate is presently that of treating
constitutionalism as the embodiment of the democratic telos. Within such a milieu, academic
debate has tended to focus too narrowly on the role and legitimacy of judicial review in such
constitutional arrangements.46 However, this has only served to reinforce the second‐class
status, at best, of popular participation and civic engagement. In contrast, we have urged that
it more constructive to think about the ways in which citizens can relate and democratize the
constitutional regime. In that sense, the adoption or rejection of judicial review is not a
problem as long as it, like every other institution and principle, is viewed as experimental and
open to democratic reconsideration. But, by moving beyond questions about the legitimacy of
judicial review, it becomes possible to think about the relationship between constitutionalism
and democracy in a new and more emancipatory light.
In particular, it obliges us to look at the relationship between citizens and constitutions and to
the means of realizing democracy at the level of the fundamental laws; this is far preferable
than obsessing about who should have the final word about the meaning of a constitutional
provision. This shift of focus will, of course, raise the political stakes exponentially. And this is
no bad thing. Rather than simply determine which of two more or less unrepresentative
institutions (i.e., the judiciary or legislature) should enjoy more power, theorists and politicians
alike will be obliged to come face‐to‐face with ordinary citizens in a genuinely democratic
encounter. This is a debate and an encounter worth having. In so many ways, not only the
United States, but the rest of the world is still looking for its modern‐day Jeffersons to help
desacrilize constitutional covenants and revitalise the well‐springs of popular participation.
This would be the wisest and most practical thing to do.
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